Please see later version of this post on May 16, 2010
Entrepreneurs are often not experts in the area of
term-sheet negotiations and all of the surrounding issues. Investors sometimes “present” the terms
they’d like and expect the entrepreneurs to react. This frequently leads to lots of expense just to get to an
understanding of what’s being asked for. A lack of understanding can lead to
expensive and difficult negotiations when more clarity earlier in the process may
have produced a more efficient and less difficult result.
Now that I’m more often on the other side of the term-sheet,
I’ve tried to present term-sheets to entrepreneurs accompanied by a
philosophical explanation of what I’m proposing, and why.
I’ve sat down with entrepreneurs and a copy of a term sheet
guide I like [“Term Sheets &
Valuations - A Line by Line Look at the Intricacies of Venture Capital Term
Sheets & Valuations” by Alex Wilmerding, Aspatore Press.] and walked
through each proposed term and why it is or isn’t important. When accompanied by an “output”
spreadsheet that shows the results and implications of terms, this often makes
the process work pretty well.
This essay is an attempt to replicate some of that thinking.
(Here's a copy of the accompanying spreadsheet.)
The Valuation Question
When companies seeking their first round of serious funding
are good enough to receive a term-sheet from an investor, the first issue that
always arises is valuation.
Good investors use the valuation discussions to gauge the
business savvy of the management team and to understand their ability to
appreciate and deal with economic market forces that set values. Most often, investors who are
interested in a company raise this issue first to measure the company’s
response to a market value offer.
The investors and the entrepreneurs are – or should be –
aware that the price of the company’s equity is set by the market – in simplest
terms, what an informed buyer is willing to pay. As a starting point, these become market comparable
discussions based on other similar transactions within a recent timeframe and
similar business.
Let’s look at how the investor arrives at a value from a
philosophical point of view.
Most often, investors have a return target in mind to help
them gauge opportunities. For
individual angels and others investing their own money, this may be more fluid
than for someone with responsibility for a managed fund. For angel groups, the
distinction between groups and VCs on this issue is dwindling, especially as
angel groups do bigger rounds of financing.
I’ve attached a spreadsheet to this article to illustrate
the issues in numbers. You can
vary both valuation and term-sheet assumptions (in the gray boxes) to assess
the impact on the values of the business.
Note that this applies only to earl stage Series A-type equity
financings and assumes no cash dividends are paid to investors. It also assumes
the entire value of the investment is captured for investors at a sale of the
company in the time specified in the term-sheet.
Let’s start at the end. On the last line on page two of the workbook, you see the
resulting returns to the entrepreneur with a variety of terms and valuations
and assumptions. (Originally the
sheet showed that selling at $118MM yields a return to the entrepreneur of $73MM).
Now let’s go back to the beginning and begin to understand
how one might come to this result.
It starts with the return the investor expects, not normally
with what the entrepreneur thinks the company is “worth.” (Both of these points of view will be
tempered by market comparables, i.e., what other willing buyers might pay, but
more on that in a moment.)
If you look at the spreadsheet, you will see that the
“Required Rate of Return” is expressed as an IRR. Some people will talk about this as a “multiple,” i.e., “I
expect ten times my investment back.”
I find this to be imprecise because it doesn’t encapsulate the element
of time. Internal Rates of Return
naturally compound, so a 50% IRR is 7.59 times at 5 years and 11.39 times at
six years. (If you plug in an IRR
of 58.5% you’ll arrive at a multiple of 10 for a five year period.)
Let’s work i with a five-year horizon. That is, the investor assumption is
that the company will be sold in 5 years.
The investors believe they have market opportunities that
can meet or exceed their desired IRR of 50% p.a. So, on a $2MM investment, and a five year horizon, they are
expecting a minimum return of $15.2MM. (7.59 times the investment.)
Next, they carefully consider the range of multiples being
used today to value companies being
acquired or doing IPOs in the market that the business is in.
As an example, I have used an EBIT multiple
here of 7.65
An EBIT multiple, multiplied by the fifth year EBIT projection, results in an
estimate of what the company might sell for in the future given market conditions as they are today. In this example, it’s
7.65 x $15.504MM equals $118.605MM.
Now turn to the company performance projections. Five-year projections, of course, are
never accurate. And if they are
built from the top down, they’re pretty much useless. However, if they are built bottom up,
they demonstrate and make explicit a range of business model assumptions the
entrepreneur is using to think about his business and its revenue model.
This is why a bottom up approach is more credible. In a bottom up approach, the forecast
is built from actual user projections.
(“If we can close 35% of all opportunities, and can get an opportunity
by making x contacts, and there are 300 opportunities per month, then we should
be able to sell 100 customers per month if we have the capital ($35 per
contact) to cover the market every month.” This results in a five-year projection of XYZ.)
So, after having built a working business model with a
bottom up projection, let’s assume the five year number in this example is
$91MM in revenue. Let’s also
assume that the market EBIT is about 16% and the entrepreneur thinks he can do
17%, a not unreasonable expectation.
Now, the investor asks:
·
What happens if 5 year EBIT drops from the $15MM
projection to $5MM?
·
What happens if the EBIT %age erodes from 17% to
12%?
·
What happens if the projected growth rate
declines more rapidly than projected?
A simple way to model this is to reduce both EBIT
projections and the market multiple to project terminal values.
This results in a range of sale prices; in this example from
$118.6MM to $21MM. Note that the
“reductions” in this worksheet are only examples for illustrative purposes and
are not necessarily normative.
An average of these ranges results in a pre-money valuation
of about $4MM. ($2mm invested
divided by an average % ownership required to me the investor’s target of
33%).
Next, the investor considers the current M&A market
conditions. If similarly situated
companies are seeing $3.5MM pre-money valuations, this might become the target
valuation.
Why, you ask, waste all of your time cranking through all of
this only to arrive at a value based on comparable transactions?
First of all,
both parties ought to be mindful of M&A market values. If the entrepreneur has two competing
offers, that’s an excellent way to understand what the market will pay. Market comparables represent the other
way.
Secondly, if the result of the analysis yielded a valuation
that only worked at the top of the range, (i.e., the highest value for the
company translated to the M&A market comparable and the other scenarios
were less) the investor would have to either really understand why or simply
walk away. So M&A market
comparables cannot, in the investors mind, be a substitute for doing the work.
After all of this, in this example, all parties agree on a
pre-money valuation of $3.5MM and a $2MM investment, giving the investor a
33.2% stake in the company.
The Consideration of Risk
It is logical to ask why a Term Sheet contains all kinds of
complexities if everyone has agreed upon the valuation discussed above. The answer to that, in a word, is risk, - the uncertainty of outcome.
Term-sheets for preferred stock offerings are designed to protect the investor
in case things don’t go as well as planned.
Investors want to protect their investment in the company by
using tools that help assure that, in a less successful situation, they can
still achieve some or all of their goals.
If entrepreneurs believe that they can achieve the projected results,
they will generally feel comfortable by accepting terms that reduce the
investors perception of risk.
Entrepreneurs should be aware of this and negotiate terms
accordingly.
At the financial level,
and assuming a harvest of the investment in the company without the need for
further financing, two terms stand out as driving economics: the dividend and
the liquidation preference.
First, dividends. The risk-protection sense of a dividend
is that the invested money makes some interest-like return, which makes it more
likely the investor will receive some modest amount of earnings in the event
the company doesn’t do well. In some cases, dividends are often paid at the
discretion of the board and not required by the terms.
Dividends come in two basic flavors – cumulative and
non-cumulative. A cumulative
dividend compounds annually.
In the example on the spreadsheet, a cumulative 8% dividend
paid every year for five years pays $938,000 while a non-cumulative dividend
pays about $800,000. A cumulative
dividend can get to be very expensive and is not often a feature in early stage
terms. Dividends, finally, are
normally not paid in cash; they are accrued and paid at the sale of the
company, if they have been declared each year by the board.
Most investors aren’t focused on dividends, and I see very
few cumulative dividend term-sheets.
So, let’s assume here we have an 8% non-cumulative dividend. In most cases, the preferred dividend
is paid before any dividend is paid to the common.
In some rare cases, there may also be a participation
provision for dividends which pays the preferred a dividend beyond their own
equal to any dividend paid to the common.
It is very expensive if you’re the entrepreneur since it doubles the
cost to the company of paying dividends to the entrepreneur. I’ve never seen it in practice.
Second a liquidation
preference and a participation.
A liquidation preference means that the investors receive
their investment back (plus dividends) prior to a distribution of the proceeds
to stockholders.
The risk-reduction feature here is that the investor
receives all of his money back before the entrepreneur receives anything. Why is this fair? Say I invest $1MM in a company and
receive 40% of the stock. After
some time, it becomes evident the company is never going to be really
successful, and a larger player in the market offers to buy the company for
$2MM. With a preference, I get
$1MM back and then the remaining proceeds are divided so I would receive $1.4MM
out of $2MM. If the entrepreneur
doesn’t feel this kind of result if feasible because he/she will move mountains
to achieve outstanding results, they shouldn’t care about this very much.
The investor may also ask for a participation in which the
investors receive some additional multiple of their investment prior to
distribution of proceeds to stockholders.
So, for instance, the investor in the above example with a 1x
participation (a pretty common term these days) would get $2MM – the original
investment back and 1x that investment in addition – before the entrepreneur
receives anything. Again, the
feature of this is that it reduces investor risk and requires some level of
achievement before the entrepreneur is ultimately rewarded.
On page two of the spreadsheet, you can see the result of
dividends, liquidation preferences, and participation terms.
You can see how these affect the harvest proceeds and
investor multiples achieved at various levels.
Non-financial terms affecting Risk
Other major term-sheet provisions, in addition to these
economic considerations, also focus on reducing investor risk.
These include:
·
Vesting
of Founder Stock. Especially in situations where the founders have a large
position and are key employees, it is not uncommon for investors to request
that they agree to have some portion of their holdings vest on a schedule. This is perceived by some investors as
a way to assure that the founders are in the game for the long run.
·
Conversion
provisions allowing preferred to convert to common if they choose or upon
the closing of an IPO at a specified price. This is most commonly used when a conversion confers
superior economic benefits on the preferred stockholder.
·
Anti-dilution
provisions that reduce the price of the preferred shares (using a variety
of formulas) in the event that the company issues new stock at a lower
price. A full ratchet
anti-dilution clause is very unfriendly to entrepreneurs; it requires them to
make up the entire difference in price from their own holdings. Weighted average methods tend to
spread the pain of dilution over all of the existing stockholders using a
variety of “weighted” methods. Pay
to play provisions are often found here which specify that an investor loses
their anti dilution rights if they do not buy their pro-rata share of a new
offering.
·
Voting
rights. Preferred vote their
shares “as if converted” to common so that they exercise substantial voting
control over items requiring stockholder votes.
·
Protective
provisions. These confer certain veto rights upon the preferred holders
that restrict the company’s ability to take action adverse to the preferred
without their consent.
·
Board
composition. Boards of
directors have specific duties and voting rights – things like appointing
officers of the company, overseeing financial matters, and so forth. A savvy investor will look for a
company that has an orientation to outside, impartial directors. This typically indicates a management
team that understands the value of outside directors as a way of strengthening
the company. Investors will want
to have a seat at the table.
Oftentimes, term-sheets specify provisions under which there is not a
majority on the board from either founders or investors. Sometimes investors will also ask for
observation rights so that they may bring expertise to the board without
necessarily requiring more voting seats than would be practical.
·
Registration
and demand rights are provisions that require a company to file for an IPO
under certain circumstances.
·
Right of
First Refusal confers on the preferred investor the right to purchase
either all of or their pro-rata share of future offerings in the event of a
future financing. The right of
first refusal for all of a future financing is a very unfriendly provision to
entrepreneurs that can make future financing all but impossible. It essentially gives the investor the
right to take all of a future offering, which means that no new investor will
consider spending the time to make a deal knowing that the existing investor
can walk away with it.
·
Conditions
Precedent mean that the closing of the proposed offering is subject to the
conditions specified here. This
can often include due diligence review of technology and intellectual property;
execution of employment and invention agreements; agreement on definitive
documents, and so forth.
·
Other
items often include the creation of an employee stock option pool prior to
closing; restrictions on sales of common stock to third parties; key man
insurance, and D&O liability insurance provisions, among others.
Seen from a 35,000-foot vantage point, term-sheets and
valuations are a method of assessing risk and making mutual promises about
assuming various risk components.
My own practice, as I mentioned at the beginning of this
note, in negotiating term-sheets is to build a real version of the attached
theoretical spreadsheet, and sit down with the entrepreneur, the spreadsheet
and a copy of “Term Sheets &
Valuations - A Line by Line Look at the Intricacies of Venture Capital Term
Sheets & Valuations” by Alex Wilmerding, Aspatore Press.
Once we can all agree on the principles of risk and its
management, I find it relatively easier to discuss the other terms in the
term-sheet. Wilmerding lays out
investor-friendly, entrepreneur-friendly, and neutral terms in an easy to
understand way. I personally find
the process of negotiating to be much easier to agree if both parties
understand the meaning of the terms at the time they talk about them.